Introduction
The economic history of Germany's Great War appears intellectually unexciting. It is the story of a failed blitz campaign and a subsequent war of attrition. It is the chronicle of disappointed expectations, painful adjustment, and of quixotic efforts to ignore reality. It is the account of an insufficient resource base, and probably of misallocation and disingenuous economic planning. And last, it is the story of a half-constitutional yet undemocratic system in denial of defeat, unable to compromise, unable to make peace, finally drawing the whole of society into the abyss of its own political and military collapse.
A tragedy foretold: in the winter of 1914, the Kaiser's military commander in chief, Erich von Falkenhayn, informed his government that Germany's war effort had failed, that its military machinery lay in pieces, and that the only way out of the deadlock would be through diplomatic channels, see Mommsen [2001, p. 47] . Whatever the changing fate of Germany's armies on the battlefield after that date, events in the end proved Falkenhayn right. Hardach [1973] and Ferguson [1998] have taken this point to the extreme. They argued that contrary to conventional wisdom and popular myths, the economics of World War I explain little, if anything that goes beyond the military facts of late 1914.
This survey chapter on the German economy at war is about these seemingly residual economics of World War I on the German side. Analysis of even the most basic facts and figures is considerably more difficult than in the case of Britain or the United States. While contemporary statistics were more than incomplete, statistical compilations by later scholars have mostly evaded World War I. Analysis of the few data that do exist reveals that the German war economy was probably robust but nevertheless suffered severe reductions of output and productivity. Still, the German war economy appears to have been less unstable than previously thought. While previous research has found evidence of large-scale redistribution of income and of heavily inflationary war finance, closer examination of the data gives a more balanced impression of the German economy -seemingly adding to the lack of excitement.
However, analysis cannot stop there. Scholars and politicians since Rosa Luxemburg [1913] and Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin (1915) have argued that imperialist rivalry, driven by the alleged dysfunctions of 19 th century capitalism, was at the root of World War I.
Whatever the truth of this claim, the apparent military failure of German maritime imperialism deeply affected the political discourse of Germany's political right during the war. While Anglo-Saxon writing about World War I often takes the 19 th century as its reference point, post-war historians in Germany have interpreted World War I largely by its implications for World War II. In a hugely influential study, Fritz Fischer [1967] noticed an abrupt swing in Germany's imperial ambitions towards Eastern
Europe during World War I. Although not quite accepted as the official doctrine, internal memoranda at the top level now suggested the formation of a continental empire. Their analysis consisted in a highly explosive cocktail of Malthusianism, Darwinian concepts of racism, and of mistaken conclusions from Germany's faltering war effort. This paper will follow a German tradition to argue that herein lies the true significance of Germany's war economy of World War I. Misapplied economic analysis combined with a surprising overestimation of economic warfare to generate a new blend of German imperialism, which foreshadowed Germany's second war from 1939 on.
The remaining sections of this chapter will be organised as follows. The next section looks into output, capital, and labour during the war. Section 3 analyses the distribution of incomes in the German economy and their potential for social conflict as one possible reason for Germany's collapse. Section 4 turns to external economic warfare, notably the allied blockade and Germany's U-Boot campaigns. Section 5 looks into the proportions of Germany's food problem. Section 6 reviews war finance as a possible check to German efficiency during the war. Section 7 takes the analysis to the political discourse at the time. The redirection of Germany's imperialist thrust towards
Eastern Europe and the failures of its war economy turn out to be two sides of the same medal. This establishes a line of continuity that leads directly to the economic aims of Nazi Germany during World War II. Section 8 concludes.
A Real Bad Business Cycle
What does a war shock do to economic behaviour? The war-related resource drain on national product operates very much like a major productivity shock, which exogenously reduces incomes and living standards. For consumers, this generates a strong incentive to smooth out the shock over time, be it through the depletion of stocks or through borrowing. In addition, the shock induces a real business cycle: faced with the very low returns from going to work, consumers value their free time higher and decide to work less to ride out the shock. In a great war where emotions fly high, this effect gets even more pronounced: volunteers on either side of the front leave their workplaces in droves to enlist in their armies. Volunteers to the combatant armies prefer spending their time in the trenches killing each other to going to the factory in the morning. This generates a bad real business cycle, from which the participating economies take time to recover.
World War I indeed dealt a severe and persistent blow to Germany's output, labour input and productivity. Mobilisation in the summer of 1914 reduced the workforce, and the sudden shift away from civilian to military uses of national product induced considerable unemployment for a while. In the aggregate, output suffered a persistent decline that was not to be reversed until well into the hyperinflation of 1920-23. Table   1 shows estimates of national income between 1913 and 1928.
( Table 1 about here) As can be seen, results differ widely. Henning's rather favourable index of national income is derived from output estimates, however without making its method of calculation explicit. It must be regarded as a mere guess, albeit one that has been highly influential. On the other end of the scale is Roesler's rather pessimistic estimate, which he derives from extrapolating industrial production onto the aggregate economy. The indices of Graham and of Maddison [1991] include agriculture along with industry, while the index of Witt works from deflated income tax data. Maddison's index is spliced to a highly optimistic estimate of output in 1925 by Hoffmann [1965] ;
hence its upward deviation from most of the other estimates after 1918. The last two columns in Table I represent two estimates of national product of Ritschl and Spoerer [1997] , which combine the data employed by Graham and by Maddison with informa-tion on output in transport and services and two different weighing schemes for sectoral value added in 1913.
It is noteworthy that most series in Table 1 show a decline in output or income during the war. Also, the income data produced by Witt appear to fit very well in the general picture drawn by the revised Maddison estimates of Ritschl and Spoerer [1997] . Maddison's own series is the apparent exception. Maddison's index is based on the same data on industrial and agricultural output as the estimates of Graham and of Ritschl and Spoerer. As the data employed in these indices show that output in both sectors fell, Maddison's index implicitly assumes that output in transport and services grew fast enough to overcompensate the decline in the other sectors. The series of Ritschl and Spoerer are merely the result of replacing this assumption with more conservative estimates of output in services.
Indeed, output in industry and agriculture dropped by more than most of the aggregate estimates in Table 1. Table 2 gathers the information and provides a rough breakdown.
( Table 2 about here)
The output of armament-related industries declined until 1915 and then recovered from 1916 on, when control over the economy was tightened and new armament programmes were implemented, see Roth [1997] . However, this increase came at a cost:
output dried up in the other industries. Surprisingly, it also decreased in agriculture where additional output was needed the most.
Employment appears to have broadly matched the path of output in the various sectors of the German economy. The total workforce in industry dropped by roughly ten percent (Table 3 ).
( Table 3 about here) As would be expected, male labour input fell sharply, while female labour input increased, though not by the same number. At the same time, a pronounced sectoral shift into armament and away from peacetime industries took place. Given that the average workweek was extended, the data in Table 3 must underestimate employment.
Reliable information on the number of hours worked per week during the war is apparently not to be had. Bry [1960, Table A.43] estimates the spread between hourly and weekly wages to have increased by 12 percent. Thus it is possible that total hours in industry increased slightly, despite the fall in the number of persons employed.
Bry's estimate is probably a lower bound for the increase in industrial labour time, as work on Sunday was reintroduced and shift lengths were often extended aggressively. The results of the rough guess in Table 4 look rather devastating. Productivity per person employed seems to have fallen between 20 and 30 percent, depending on the various different industry groups. The aggregate industry estimate (column I) even puts the overall decrease at over one third.
Unfortunately, the industry classifications underlying the data in Tables 2 and 3 do not match each other exactly, see Kocka [1978, p. 13] . As a result, the estimates of sectoral productivity changes are inconsistent with the calculated industry aggregate. To produce a coherent estimate, column V gives an employment-weighed estimate of aggregate industrial productivity. This measure shows industrial productivity decline to be lower than the aggregate (in column I) would suggest, but still puts the cumulative productivity decrease per person at 22%.
The decline in industrial productivity looks even more pronounced if allowance is made for an overall increase in hours by 20% as in columns VI-X of Table 4 . The hourly productivity decline measured in this way lies somewhere between one third and over 40%. An employment-weighed average (column X) suggests that industrywide productivity per person-hour declined by 35 %.
One possible reason why productivity suffered suggests itself from looking deeper into the industry structure of output. While output in war-related industries such as non-ferrous metals increased, it decreased sharply in everything not related to the war.
We also find a remarkable stagnation and eventual collapse of output in iron and steel, despite its strategic importance. The enormous disproportions in sectoral output imply that capital utilisation rates must have been suboptimal in most industries, driving down aggregate labour productivity.
( Table 5 about here)
Reliable employment data for the aggregate economy seem hard to come by. As a rough consistency check for the above productivity estimates, the national product and income data from Table 1 are therefore calculated into total population (Table 6 ).
This measure is biased to the extent that expansion of employment, in particular of female labour force participation, failed to compensate for the men drafted to the military.
( German naval strategy in World War I rested largely on not using her navy. Two unintended naval battles had proven the superiority of Britain's fleet and quenched Ger-many's appetite for more of the same, see Hardach [1973, p. 21f.] . As things stood, the German navy was strong enough to defend its coastline and ports but failed to present the fundamental risk to Britain's war strategy that Germany's strategists had dreamt of before the war, see Ferguson [1998, p. 83 ff.] . Consequently, Germany had no direct military means at her disposal against the allied blockade, in spite of most heavy investment into its fleet before the war. Retaliation thus seemed to be the only way out.
Information on the German balance of payments during World War I is sparse. The only extant series seem to be in Kleine-Natrop (1922) who may have worked from internal files, Hardach [1973, p. 42] . Table 7 reproduces these figures in current and gold values and calculates implicit price deflators and terms of trade indices.
( Table 7) Even in current prices, Germany's external trade dropped significantly after 1914. Not unlike Germany's autarky policies of the 1930s, war affected exports even more than imports, which implied foreign exchange shortage on top of the trade reduction as such, Ritschl [2001] . In real terms, German imports during the war remained at 40-60% below their peacetime levels, while exports fell even further. A look at the implied import prices and terms of trade in the marks. This would imply a cumulative decline of 71% instead of the 61% implicit in Table 7 . Whatever the true figure, it seems evident that the blockade managed to inflict far greater damage on the German war economy than the not-so-yellow submarines did to England. Table 8 relates trade to national income. Relative autarky should be reflected in a decline in the ratio of imports to output.
( Table 8 about Still, the trade balance provides only an incomplete account of Germany's access to and use of foreign resources. Employment of prisoners of war and of foreign contracted workers increased to sizeable proportions during the war (Table 9 ). (Table 9) Even the use of forced labour was attempted: in October, 1916, Germany began deporting Belgian workers at rates of 2000 per week and more, transferring them in freight trains to camps in Germany, see Hardach [1973, p. 76f.] . There is even a history of Jewish forced labour during World War I, deported to Germany from Poland, Elsner and Lehmann [1988] . Under the pressure of international protests, deportations stopped in February 1917 and most (but not all) workers were repatriated.
Too Much Distribution? Wages and Social Conflict
Domestic labour market policy at the beginning of the war was remarkably disori- Hardach [1973, p. 195] .
To organise war production and labour allocation, a new central planning authority called "Kriegsamt", or war office, was established. However, its competences remained unclear, and as a result of political horse-trading between the civilian government, parliamentary opposition, trade unions, and employers' associations, it became subordinate to the war ministry. This was not what the military had hoped for, and although it may have prevented Germany's political system from sliding into outright military dictatorship, it did less than expected to increase efficiency in production Feldman [1966, part VI] .
The net effect of labour regulation and market forces on wages and the distributional position of labour is unclear. In an influential study, Kocka [1978, ch. II] has argued for a shift in income distribution towards organised capital. His evidence is based on data of Bry [1960] on the erosion of real wages in large parts of industry (Table 10 ).
( Table 10 about here)
The upper part of Table 10 shows that wages were robust in the armament industry and declined the most in civilian industries. Bry [1960, p. 210 ] also notes the relatively strong position of women's wages in armament industry, who suffered only modest real wage declines even towards the end of the war. Kocka [1978, p. 25ff.] interprets German wage policies as evidence of intentional redistribution away from labour and hence, of increased social polarization. As an alternative test, Table 10 calculates the implied sectoral wage shares, obtained from calculating the earnings data into the sectoral output estimates of Table 2 Broadberry and Ritschl [1995] . We first calculate the unweighed average of the wage shares from the sectoral data above. Results suggest that the distributional position of labour indeed deteriorated sharply after 1916. However, they also imply that it actually increased before that. A second exercise (bottom panel part of Table 10 ) calculates aggregate wage data collected by Ferguson [1998, p. 272 ] from various different sources into the aggregate industrial production index of Wagenführ [1933, p.23] .
Although the reliability of the wage series is not beyond doubt, the calculated wage share traces the sectoral evidence quite well. Evidently, composition effects in the labour forces influenced also the industrial wage share. Women and unskilled workers were employed in increasing proportion, which tended to lower the wage bill. However, there existed also a counteracting effect, as the general decline in real wages was accompanied by a compression of the wage scale. Table 11 presents evidence on nominal earnings in a sample of 479 firms in Bavaria. As can be seen, unskilled males, women, and young workers generally gained ground in relative terms. The important exception to this rule is armament industry, where skill premia still increased.
( Table 11 about here) Nevertheless, the country saw several waves of strikes during the war, beginning in 1915 with protests against shortened rations and with quests for peace, and then on an accelerating scale. Ferguson [1998, p. 275] has argued that labour disputes were far less widespread in Germany than in Britain and that their importance has therefore been exaggerated. ( Table 12 about here)
The data in Table 12 show that except for 1917, the number of workers on strike in process is clearly minor, as table 10 above shows. However, the fact that output and living standards had declined overall can hardly be ignored.
No Milk Today: The German Food Crisis
Conventional wisdom has it that food scarcity caused German morale to wane on the home front, before military resistance collapsed. There are good reasons for this view, see e.g. the exposition in Offer [1989, chs. 4-5] . German food supplies may have resisted the Allied blockade longer and better than expected. But clearly, they fell throughout the war, and in the end barely exceeded subsistence. Table 13 lists German food imports from 1916 to 1918. (Table 13 about here)
Again, the effects of the intensified blockade after 1916 are visible: imported quantities were reduced sharply and sometimes almost collapsed. For 1918, Table 10 provides a breakdown between the first and the second half of the year. It shows that apparently, an attempt was made in the last months of the war to improve the food situation slightly, however to little avail.
Regulation of food production and distribution started quite soon. Price caps were introduced and efforts made to put both production and distribution of agricultural commodities under public control. To increase the amount of grains available for human consumption, the government decreed a much-disputed mass slaughter of hogs, ironically referred to in the debate as "Schweinemord". Given the wrong price signals set by the price cap system and by quantity regulations, German agriculture arguably produced below capacity, see e.g. Skalweit [1927] , from where the data are taken.
However, much of the decline in German food rations is clearly due to faltering im- Conventional wisdom has for a long time accepted almost unconditionally that German war finance was based far less on taxes than Britain's and was, hence, less sound and more prone to inflation. Faced with an adverse productivity shock of major proportions, an individual consumer has a strong incentive to smooth out consumption, be it through the depletion of stocks or through borrowing. This incentive is especially strong in the presence of a distortionary tax system, in which the government's attempt to cover the cost of war through taxation would cause immense deadweight loss. Provided the government's claim to honouring its war bonds after a war is credible, agents will prefer smoothing out the tax burden over time to paying the bill instantly. This, in loose and abridged form, is the Barro view of war finance. Viewed from this perspective, the popular argument that German war finance was necessarily unsound is economic nonsense. To the extent that German war finance was more strongly debt-oriented than in Britain, the Barro view would either conclude that the Fritzes were more risk averse than the Tommies (that is to say, their period utility function had a stronger curvature), or it would hold that Germany's tax system was more distortionary than its British counterpart.
Bordo and White [1991] argue that since the 1720s, Britain under the gold standard had accumulated a sound record of honouring war bonds at par after a war. It seems that Germany, on the contrary, did not have an established reputation in 1913: while Prussia's fiscal policy had been extremely conservative throughout the 19 th century, the same could not be said of the Southern German states. Germany had embarked on the gold standard only in 1875, and the credibility of this commitment had not yet been put to test. The same is not true of France, which had paid for the 1871 war and her reparations to Germany through borrowing, and had honoured the debt in full gold value despite deflationary tendencies in the Great Depression of the 1880s. Yet, Germany was remarkably successful in selling war bonds during most of World War I.
( Table 14 about here) Table 14 shows the revenues and expenditure of the various levels of government in Germany together with the deficits, excluding seignorage from the calculations. As can be seen, deficits weighed heavily in financing Germany's budget during the war, although clearly less so than the older literature has claimed. This point has been made previously by , from whose work the figures in Table 14 are adapted. A slightly harder exercise is to calculate the amount of debt monetisation through the central bank. In most accounts of the German hyperinflation of 1920 to 1923, debt finance during the war is still the main culprit. Careful reading of Holtfrerich [1986] already suggests that all is not well with this belief. Given the opaqueness of Germany's public budgeting procedures, borrowing and debt statistics from various different sources are seldom compatible. Column I and II give the deficits in the two main components of its budget, the ordinary and extraordinary account. Column III provides independent figures on the increase in central government debt from the public debt statistics. As can be seen, the data are roughly consistent in their cumulative sum to 1917/18 but not afterwards (see factors would have to remain tax free in peacetime. This is consistent with the standard result of the Ramsey theory of taxation, which holds that capital gains taxes are suboptimal. Ramsey taxation is one interpretation of the attempts after World War I to impose capital levies, as reviewed by Eichengreen [1990] in comparative perspective.
It may be an interpretation of Germany's inflation after World War I. However, the willingness of the public to accept German war bonds evidently persisted throughout the war. Had German war finance consisted in expropriating holders of public debt and fiat money, some version of the Ramsey view of war finance could probably apply. Given the rather conservative figures on debt monetisation, there seems to be little justification for that. Ritschl, 1990 ].
Malthusian interpretations of Germany's food problem probably went back to the 1890s. Then, a controversy between defenders of unlimited industrialization and proponents of a balance between industry and agriculture had emerged, in which Blockadefestigkeit, or blockade proofness, and Kriegsernährung, or wartime food supplies, took centre stage. Malthusians argued that German population growth could not be stopped, as Darwinists would later add that it shouldn't. In the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles, the German representatives used Malthusian reasoning to argue that without sufficient Lebensraum, or habitat, the German population would be doomed to immiserisation and starvation. This may not be surprising in itself. What does surprise in retrospect is the deep impression which this appears to have made on Keynes [1920] . In the 1920s, the German economist Werner Sombart, then a grand old man in his field, chaired a prize committee for a competition. Participants were asked to submit essays on how to feed a growing population on the reduced territory of the Weimar Republic. Birth control and foreign trade had been excluded from the list of admissible answers as being trivial and unfeasible solutions to the problem, see Ritschl [1990] . This was the mindset that increasingly framed perceptions and expectations among the political right in Germany. Mommsen [2001, p.153 ] has referred to the First World War as "the incubation phase of a new, aggressively völkisch nationalism und of radical anti-semitism, which spread at a rapid speed and gradually cast its spell over larger and larger parts of the population". Given this state of mind, both
Wilson's fourteen points and the Treaty of Versailles offered a peace arrangement that was too lax and too strict at the same time.
One reason is that the outcome of the war in 1918 was not as clear as it should have been. Germany's economy was exhausted but not in ruins. Food rations were minimal but not obviously below subsistence. The army was technically defeated, but Germany had not been invaded yet. Strikes in the metal industry and mutinies in the Navy -which was about to be sent off for a final suicide mission -accelerated the political implosion of Germany, all before the defeat was visible to the layman. Soon, "stabin-the-back" myths were spreading, which asserted that the army had been knocked out, not by enemy action in the battlefield but by faltering morale on the home front.
Such urban legends may have helped the uninformed average German to overcome the cognitive dissonance between propaganda and reality. However, they undermined the legitimacy of the new republic from the first day, and laid the ground for future revenge. Although the German side had sought an armistice and reluctantly began to cope with Wilson's Fourteen Points, neither the army under Hindenburg and Ludendorff nor the Kaiser himself accepted political liability for what followed. The army's high command was replaced, Wilhelm II. went into exile, and the onus for the armi-stice and the terms of the peace treaty fell on the new republic that was hastily formed in November, 1918. The man who signed the armistice for Germany, Matthias Erzberger, did not survive for long: a death squad on the German Navy's unofficial payroll assassinated him in 1921, see Sabrow [1994] . This survey chapter on the German economy at war has taken issue with both the smallprint and the wider theme. It has argued that conventional wisdom on the redistribution of income during the war may need to be revised. Social history has pictured Germany during World War I as an increasingly oppressive regime that cut back on workers' rights and altered the distribution of income in favour of capital. This chapter shows that these results appear to suffer from sample selection bias. While profit margins indeed increased very strongly in armament industry, the picture in other in-dustries is very different. In the aggregate, the distributional position of labour appears to have remained rather unchanged; a redistribution of incomes took place, not so much between labour and capital but rather between capital across different industries. Consequently, historical accounts of the early inter-war period in Germany and its social conflicts that rest on a worsened relative position of labour will likely need revision.
This paper has also taken a fresh look at the issue of German war finance and its inflationary character. Building on earlier research of , we find that the ratio of public borrowing to tax revenues in Germany during the war hardly higher than in Britain. The same turns out to be true of the rate at which these debts were monetised. Thus, the fiscal histories of Britain and Germany during World War I look rather similar, while their inflation histories after the end of the war could hardly be more different. There appears to be little, if any role for public borrowing in Germany in explaining the later hyperinflation.
Still the most important perspective on the German war economy is perhaps not its immediate effects on the war or its immediate aftermath -the results in the present paper would tend to de-emphasise these even further. Crucial for the further evolution Tables 2 and 3. (2) Industry totals in columns I and VI not consistent with sectoral totals. (3) Corrected totals weighed by employment in same year from Table 3 . Source:
Output: Table 2 Labour: Table 3 77.7 Table 5 Production of Selected Goods and Industries, 1913=100 Notes: (1) Overall total excludes POWs abroad and forced labour.
Source: Daniel [1989, p. 57, 59 ]. Elsner and Lehmann [1988, p. 74] . Source: Bry [1960, p. 199] Unweighed avg. From sectoral averages Weighed avg. from total wage bill and total person-hours Table 12 Strikes in the War Economies of Germany and Britain, 1914-1918 No. of workers on strike (1000) Days lost (1000)
